Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Assessed. This page states a conclusion. Our assessment is below.
Edition label: 2026-11
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Definition: The two-prong Fourth Amendment test from Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence: a person enjoys constitutional protection where (1) they exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.1
Overview
Articulated in Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States (1967), the two-prong reasonable-expectation inquiry added a privacy-based framework to Fourth Amendment doctrine.2 It did not displace the property/trespass test: United States v. Jones (2012) confirms that a physical trespass to obtain information remains an independent route to finding a search.3
Smith v. Maryland (1979) applied the third-party doctrine, first set out for bank records in United States v. Miller (1976), to dialed telephone numbers: information voluntarily disclosed to a third party (e.g., the phone company) carries no reasonable expectation of privacy,4 on which the government later relied to defend the post-9/11 Section 215 bulk-telephony program.5 United States v. Jones (2012) confirmed that trespass remains an independent route,6 and Carpenter v. United States (2018) partially limited the third-party doctrine for cell-site location information.7
Analytical significance
On this page’s reading, the reasonable-expectation test matters to both judicial review and public oversight of classified surveillance. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) Section 215 report addresses the government’s and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court’s view that under Smith v. Maryland there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed numbers; the Wyden-Udall correspondence addressed the secret legal interpretation of Section 215 itself.8 The government’s constitutional defense of the Section 215 program rested on the third-party doctrine set out in United States v. Miller (1976) and applied to dialed numbers in Smith v. Maryland (1979); the PCLOB called Smith “the lynchpin of the government’s constitutional rationale.”9
Our assessment
Conclusion: [VERY LIKELY] (80–95%) · high confidence. The government’s constitutional defense of the Section 215 bulk-telephony program rested on the third-party doctrine of United States v. Miller (1976) and Smith v. Maryland (1979).
Evidence base: primary-multiple, partial corroboration. Administration White Paper. Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. August 9, 2013., Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Washington, DC, January 23, 2014., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Would revise if: To LIKELY if the Administration white paper’s Fourth Amendment section (Part III.A, printed pp. 19-21) is shown to rest the program’s constitutionality mainly on a ground other than Smith, such as reasonableness balancing.
Strongest counterargument: The government also argued that even if collection were a search it would be reasonable, so the third-party doctrine was one of two defenses rather than the one the defense rested on.
Response: The white paper leads its Fourth Amendment section with Smith and gives the reasonableness argument, made ‘even if one were to assume arguendo’ a search, a shorter paragraph that follows it. The independent PCLOB called Smith the lynchpin of the government’s rationale, and the FISA Court’s August 2013 opinion (not held here) said the question is ‘squarely controlled’ by Smith. A fallback argument does not change which doctrine carried the defense.
Assessed 2026-10-19. How we grade conclusions
Open Questions
- Question: How did the post-Snowden litigation (Klayman, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) v. Clapper, the post-Carpenter cases) treat the third-party doctrine of Miller and Smith in relation to bulk-collection? Given PCLOB’s account of the broad third-party doctrine10 and Chair Franklin’s description of Carpenter’s cell-site-location holding,11 how do those principles apply to bulk-telephony metadata?
Related Entities
- John Marshall Harlan II — author of the operative concurrence
Related Concepts
- Fourth Amendment Doctrine
- Trespass Doctrine — the doctrine Katz displaced as the exclusive test; Jones (2012) confirmed that trespass remains an independent route12
- Surveillance Doctrine
- Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Sources
- Supreme Court of the United States. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Decided December 18, 1967. — origin of the two-prong test13
- Supreme Court of the United States. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Decided June 19, 1972. — applied the Katz framework to domestic-security wiretaps14
- Administration White Paper. Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. August 9, 2013.
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) (slip opinion, No. 16-402).
- Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Washington, DC, September 28, 2023.
- Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Washington, DC, January 23, 2014.
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
- Wyden, Ron, and Mark Udall. Letters to Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States. U.S. Senate, September 21, 2011, and March 15, 2012.