“Invitation to Struggle”
Reference. Reports what the sources say. States no conclusion of ours.
Edition label: 2026-11
Not everything on this page is footnoted. Our citation check covers the main text, but not headings, the lists of related entries and sources, or open questions, which may state facts without a footnote. Check the footnoted text or the source before relying on them.
Definition: Edward S. Corwin’s mid-20th-century formulation of the relationship between the President and Congress on foreign policy and national security, set out in The President: Office and Powers (1940; 5th rev. ed. 1984).12 The formulation3:
“[T]he Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”4
— Corwin et al., The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984 (5th rev. ed. 1984), p. 201.5
Overview
Corwin’s formulation establishes that the U.S. constitutional architecture does not pre-determine which branch should have substantive authority over foreign policy and national security; instead, the architecture creates a structural incentive for inter-branch conflict that is resolved (when resolved at all) through political and institutional processes rather than through clear constitutional text.6 On this page’s reading, the “invitation to struggle” is descriptive — it does not prescribe an outcome, only a structural feature of the inter-branch relationship.
Three later works this page reads alongside the formulation:
- Bruemmer (1992) adopts Corwin’s formulation as the framing for his argument that both President and Congress should decline the “invitation to struggle” and proceed by cooperative reorganization (President proposes; Congress approves up-or-down).7
- Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution (1990) is cited here only through other authors, because Parallax’s copy is encrypted and cannot be opened and the book has not been read directly: Bruemmer (1992) reports that Koh offers “fast-track approval” as a model for foreign affairs legislation, and Olmsted (1996) reports Koh’s view that the Iran-Contra scandal demonstrates that the “deeper systemic flaws” exposed by the intelligence inquiries, as well as by Vietnam and Watergate, were never remedied.8
- Glennon, Double Government (2014) expressly invokes Corwin, arguing that the apparent balance among the branches is not the outcome of the struggle Corwin described: all three Madisonian institutions (the courts, Congress and the presidency) have lost effective authority to the Trumanite bureaucratic network.9
Analytical significance
Bruemmer, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) General Counsel writing in private practice and expressing his own views, recommends cooperative procedures using the Defense Base Closure model while favoring presidential leadership.10
Open Questions
- Does Corwin’s “invitation to struggle” formulation account for Glennon’s observation that the courts, Congress and the presidency have all lost effective authority to the Trumanite network,11 or does the framework need revision to account for that network? Would such a revision change the predicted outcomes of executive counter-mobilization?
- Does Corwin’s formulation explain declassification monopoly, the Intelligence Coordinating Group, the security commission pattern, the “rogue agency” narrative, and National Security Decision Directive 286 (NSDD-286) plus Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (IAA-1991) as mechanisms of executive counter-mobilization?
- Given Bruemmer’s preference for presidential leadership and a secondary congressional role,12 how does his Defense Base Closure proposal relate to executive counter-mobilization?
- Does executive-branch conduct following Bruemmer’s 1992 proposal show that structural pressures override individual reform preferences, and what evidence would distinguish that explanation from competing accounts?
- Did the first edition of Corwin’s The President: Office and Powers already contain the “invitation to struggle” passage?
Related Entities
- Edward S. Corwin — formulator
- Russell J. Bruemmer — modern adopter in intelligence-reorganization scholarship
Related Concepts
- Executive-branch counter-mobilization — executive responses to congressional investigation
- Declassification monopoly — control of classified information
- Security commission pattern — executive investigative commissions
Sources
- Bruemmer, Intelligence Community Reorganization (1992) — quotes Corwin’s 5th revised edition at pp. 201 and 25513
- Corwin, Edward S. The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1948: History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion. 3rd rev. ed. New York University Press, 1948.
- Glennon, Michael J. “National Security and Double Government.” Harvard National Security Journal 5 (2014): 1–114.
- Koh, Harold Hongju. The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. [Provisional: held ACS-encrypted scan could not be opened.]
- Olmsted, Kathryn. “Reclaiming Executive Power: The Ford Administration’s Response to the Intelligence Investigations.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 725–737.